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This article presents evidence on the relationship between compen-
sation ratios and spans of control within hierarchical organizations.
We find that compensation ratios are lower than span of control at
any position within the hierarchy, which is consistent with an elas-
ticity of compensation to a number of subordinates lower than one.
Managers’ human capital endowments determine a significant part
of the salary differences throughout hierarchical levels, as predicted
by models of talent allocation in hierarchies. Differences in the size
of firms should be attributed more to differences in their number of
hierarchical levels than to variations in the span of control.
I. Introduction
Organizational hierarchies are characterized by two main features: the
span of control in each managerial position and the evolution of salaries
throughout hierarchical levels. A significant amount of work has been
done on the distribution of salaries in multilevel organizations, but re-
search into the span of control, and especially the relationship between
salaries and span of control in intermediate hierarchical levels, is much
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more scarce.1 This article contributes to the understanding of hierarchical
organizations by providing empirical evidence on the evolution of salaries
and span of control throughout hierarchical organizations as the result
of allocating managerial talent in multilevel job positions in a sample of
Spanish firms. We also provide evidence that the evolution may be the
result of a rational process of managerial talent allocation, where talent
is approximated by managers’ human capital.
Earlier theoretical papers on the internal organization of firms (Simon
1957; Williamson 1967) model hierarchies by assuming that salaries and
span of control are exogenous to the model. Later, Beckmann (1977)
assumes that firms choose the span of control to mitigate the “loss of
control” that occurs in hierarchies, but salaries are still exogenous. Gean-
akoplos and Milgrom (1991) analyze the optimal allocation of managerial
time in order to coordinate the decisions of imperfectly informed em-
ployees, deriving implications for salaries and span of control. In all this
literature, the hierarchy is viewed as a coordinating device. Incentive issues
are introduced in Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979) and Qian (1994), but
only Qian (1994) models the two features of the hierarchy, salaries and
span of control, though assuming homogeneous managers and workers.
Another line of research (Rosen 1982; Waldman 1984; Gibbons andWald-
man 1999) investigates the allocation of different talented managers to
previously established job positions, with implications for wage forma-
tion. However, this ignores the issue of the span of control at the different
hierarchical levels.
In order to guide the empirical research, we extend the classical hier-
archical models of coordination with loss of control, assuming that the
profit-maximizing firm can chose managers with different human capital
endowments to be placed in each hierarchical position. Managers who
are more talented lower the control loss and improve overall productivity,
but they earn higher salaries and increase production costs. By choosing
the profit-maximizing level of human capital in each position, firms are
endogenously determining the span of control and the salaries earned by
the manager.2
1 Some relevant papers on the distribution of salaries in hierarchical organi-
zations are Lazear (1992); Baker, Gibbs, Holmstrom (1993, 1994a, 1994b); Lam-
bert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993); Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993); and Eriksson
(1999). There is also an extensive literature on the relationship between top man-
agers’ compensation and firms’ size; see Rosen (1992) or Murphy (1985, 1999)
for a synthesis. Extensions of these analyses to intermediate hierarchical levels
are scarce (Gerhart and Milkovich 1990; Leonard 1990), and the only evidence
on the evolution of the span of control and compensation at middle hierarchical
levels that we are aware of is Baker et al. (1993).
2 The static nature of the model drives us to ignore the problems of asymmetric
information on managers’ intrinsic ability and the consequences of learning about
this over time (as analyzed by Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
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The empirical framework predicts that, under convex cost functions of
human capital production, firms choose a span of control greater than
one in each hierarchical level, so the usual inverted tree structure emerges.
Firms also want managers who are more talented to be allocated into
higher hierarchical positions, so we should observe higher salaries being
paid in these positions. Moreover, in the profit-maximizing solution, the
ratio between compensations of managers and of their direct subordinates
is lower than managers’ span of control. This result has implications for
the value of the elasticity of substitution between managers and direct
subordinates in a given hierarchical level and for the elasticity ofmanagers’
compensation with respect to the size of the firm.
The empirical evidence is presented in three ways. First, we estimate
the average ratio of compensation between managers and their direct
subordinates, and compare it with the managers’ span of control at each
hierarchical level, using data from a large sample of Spanish firms and
managers. The comparison will provide evidence about elasticity of sub-
stitution between managers and their direct subordinates, greater than
one.
Second, the empirical analysis is extended to evaluate the proportion
of compensation variance throughout hierarchical levels in the same sam-
ple, which is explained by differences in the endowment of human capital
in each level. This is relevant because theories such as efficiency wages
(Calvo and Wellisz 1978, 1979; Qian 1994, e.g.) and tournament com-
petition (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986, e.g.) predict that salaries
will increase throughout hierarchical levels even when the manager pop-
ulation is homogeneous in talent, due to incentive reasons. However, our
framework and in general the optimal human capital allocation models
(Rosen 1982; Waldman 1984, e.g) explain compensation differences as a
function of heterogeneity in ability and talent.
Third, we decompose the elasticity of compensation to the size of
resources under control for the managers in the sample, in intra- and
interlevel effects. Since the latter appear to be more important than the
former, we conclude that in the firms of the sample, differences in their
size are explained more by differences in their number of hierarchical
levels than by differences in their span of control within a level. This
result helps to explain variations in the estimated elasticity of managerial
compensation to the size of the firm. Rosen (1992) reports that many
studies find an elasticity of around 0.25 in samples of top managers, but
Leonard (1990) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) obtain an elasticity of
around 0.005 for top and middle managers.
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents a review of the
literature on hierarchical organizations and outlines the main empirical
implications to be tested with the available data. Section III presents a
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description of the sample data and the results of the empirical estimations.
The conclusions summarize the main results.
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis
Hierarchical structures can be understood as a collection of labor con-
tracts that link workers of a given level with the subordinates that report
directly to them (Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1989). These contracts induce a
level of output Q as a function of the number of direct workers, , andLn
the inputs of their hierarchical superiors, which implies an average pro-
ductivity for each direct worker of . Therefore, , where n isb Q p b Ln n n
the lowest level, direct workers.
Let be the decrease in average productivity of directa p b /b ≤ 1j j1 j
workers that takes place when the hierarchy changes from levels toj
levels, and let be the number of subordinates at levelj 1 t p L /Lj j1 j
that report to one manager of level j, that is, the span of control.j 1
Thus, the output of the hierarchy may be written as
n1 n1
Q p b L p b  t p b t a ,n n n j j j
jp0 jp0
where b is the productivity of top management, . Notice that canj p 0 aj
also be interpreted in terms of loss of control at level j (Williamson 1967).
We assume that is not fixed, but depends on the span of controla tj j
and on the differences of human capital endowment accumulated from
the top of the hierarchy to the direct subordinates of the manager inz0
level j, :zj1
j zj1a p t   1 p t (z /z ) 1.j j j j1 0( )ip0 zi
and in order3 that . Therefore, decreases with0 ≤ z ≤ z t ≥ 1 a ≤ 1 aj1 0 j j j
the span of control and increases with the human capital endowmenttj
of the direct subordinates, . Normalizing the talent of top managerszj1
to one and substituting in the production function above, we obtain
n1 n1
(z /z ) (z /z ) (z /z )n n1 2 1 1 0Q p b L p b  t p b t a p b{t [t … (t ) …] }n n n j j j 0 1 n1
jp0 jp0
n1 n1
z z z zj1 n j j1p b t p bL L .j n j
jp0 jp1
3 Actually, this is equivalent to assuming that when and/or , su-t ≤ 1 z ≤ zj 0 j
pervision is perfect, . We omit the analysis of those cases in whicha p 1 t ! 1j j
and/or , because if there are positive profits, they will be dominated byz ! z0 j
and/or .t p 1 z p zj 0 j
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We can therefore define as the elasticity of substitution betweenjj, j1
managers of level j and their subordinates in level , for a given levelj 1
of output,
 lnQ/ lnL z  z Dzj1 j1 j2 j1
j p p p .j, j1
 lnQ/ lnL z  z Dzj j j1 j
Beckmann (1977) and Rosen (1982) assume that the elasticity of sub-
stitution above is a fixed parameter exogenous to the decisions of the
firm. We argue that firms can choose the elasticity of substitution by
modifying the differences in human capital endowments between con-
secutive levels.
The profit-maximization problem of the firm will be written as
n1 n
z 1jmaxP p pb t  w LL ,…L z ,z j j j1 n, 1… n
jp0 jp1
n1 n
z z z f(z )n j j1 jp pbL L  e L ,n j j
jp1 jp1
subject to 1 ≥ z ≥ 0, and t ≥ 1,j j
where is the price of output and is the salary of workers at level j,p wj
which depends on workers’ human capital endowment, . Wef(z )jw p ej
assume that is increasing and is a convex function of , that is, theref(z ) zj j
are decreasing returns in the production of managerial talent.4
Qian (1994) and Calvo and Wellisz (1978) use efficiency wage argu-
ments to assume that managerial effort is endogenous. Their assump-ej
tions can easily be incorporated into our model by identifying loss of
control with level of effort, . The effective productivityz 1j1e p a p tj j j
of managers in level , compared with the effort of supervisors in levelj 1
j, decreases with the span of control (supervision) and increases with
compensation. The variable is now interpreted as the response of effortzj
to changes in salary, .1z p f (lnw )j j
Appendix A shows that, at the profit-maximizing solution, the value
of increases as j approaches the top of the hierarchy, but at a decreasingzj
rate, . The first result implies that,0 ! z  z p Dz ! Dz p z  zj j1 j j1 j1 j2
in the optimal solution, compensation increases as one moves to the top
of the hierarchy, . The second result is explained by the convexityw 1 wj j1
of the cost function .f(z )j
The pattern of human capital allocation implies that, in the profit-
4 For empirical evidence of such functional forms, see Mincer (1974) or Blaug
(1992).
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maximizing solution, the elasticity of substitution between managers and
direct subordinates will be higher than one,
z  z Dzj1 j2 j1
j p p 1 1.j, j1 z  z Dzj j1 j
Moreover, we also know that in the optimal solution, the ratio of total
input costs will be equal to the elasticity of substitution between inputs,
w Lj1 j1
p j .j, j1w Lj j
Therefore,
L wj1 j
p j . (1)j, j1L wj j1
Equation (1) has two clear implications. First, the span of control
will be greater than one, and consequently the inverted treet p L /Lj j1 j
structure of the hierarchy emerges; this result comes from andw 1 wj j1
. Second, if we compare span of control in j, , with the com-j 1 1 tj, j1 j
pensation ratio also in j, , we should observeb p w /w t /b p j 1j j j1 j j j, j1
, that is, the span of control will be larger than the compensation ratio.1
Finally, notice that a simple extension of our model has implications
for the relation between compensation and number of total subordinates
reporting to managers placed at different hierarchical levels and firms.
For this purpose, we assume that firms differ in the number of hierarchical
levels, , so the compensation of the manager allocated at hierarchicalni
level j in the firm will bei
n 1 n 1i iwr, ilnw p ln w  p ln w  b .( )j, i n , i n, i r, i( )i
rpj w rpjr1, i
In order to simplify, we assume that direct worker compensation is the
same for all the firms, , that the compensation ratios and the spaniw p wn d
of control are also constant for all the firms and hierarchical levels,
, , and, consequently, . Under these assumptions,b p b t p t j p jj, i j, i j, j1, i
the number of direct workers commanded by a manager at the hierarchical
level j and firm i will be , and the managers’ compensation cann jiA p tj, i
be written as
lnb
n jjlnw p ln (w b ) p lnw  (n  j) lnb p lnw  lnA . (2)j, i d d i d j, i( )ln t
Taking into account that the elasticity of substitution among managers
and their direct subordinates is greater than one, , the elasticityt/b p j 1 1
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of managers’ compensation with respect to number of direct workers
commanded by the manager, will be less than one, .(lnb/ ln t) ! 1
Equation (2) generalizes a result of Rosen (1982) to multilevel hierar-
chies and to the case of endogenously determined elasticity of substitution.
Rosen shows that, in a two-level hierarchy, a sufficient condition for an
elasticity of manager compensation to the number of direct workers lower
than one is an elasticity of substitution among managers and direct work-
ers higher than one; however, the value of this elasticity is not derived
from the model.
In the argumentation above, the differences in the number of direct
workers among firms only derive from extensions of the hierarchical
levels. Obviously, differences in the span of control can also exist between
firms and among positions inside a given firm.How important the number
of hierarchical levels are, compared with heterogeneity within firms and
among firms in span of control, when determining the observed differ-
ences in firm size is a relevant empirical question.
Extensions
The predictions that salaries increase with hierarchical level and that
the span of control in each level is greater than one are also obtained from
models that assume homogeneous workers and different levels of effort,
as in Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Qian (1994). Of course, we could have
situations where managers differ in both human capital and effort. Calvo
and Wellisz (1979) allow for differences in the quality of supervision in
a model with a fixed number of hierarchical levels. They find that man-
agers who are more able should be placed in higher hierarchical positions,
earn higher salaries, and command larger spans of control. The third
prediction, that the optimal span of control increases with the hierarchical
level, does not follow from our model, which tells us nothing about the
evolution of the span of control, of the increase in salaries, or of the
elasticity of substitution among managers and subordinates throughout
hierarchical levels.
The information-processing model of the managerial function devel-
oped by Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) shows that the ablest managers
will be allocated to the top of the hierarchy only when their decisions
affect the subsequent information processing of their subordinates. In
these cases, the authors point out that certain substitutions can exist be-
tween managerial abilities and span of control, something that is also
captured in our framework.
Another issue, ignored in the model, is the possible use of the tour-
nament type of incentives to extract greater managerial effort. By attaching
higher salaries to higher hierarchical positions and filling vacancies with
the worker who exerts more effort at the level below, a strong incentive
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system is created, which will stimulate effort with low direct supervision.
These are the foundations of the tournament theory, put forward by
Lazear and Rosen (1981). Salaries are again attached to jobs, but no pre-
diction is made with respect to the implications for decision on the span
of control in the hierarchy. Rosen (1986) goes on to develop a model with
an elimination tournament structure, and predicts that the shape of the
compensation function throughout hierarchical levels should present a
“convex shape,” that is, compensation increases should be higher at the
upper levels of the hierarchy.
Empirical Predictions
The presentation above makes clear predictions about the evolution of
span of control and compensation within hierarchies. We now summarize
these predictions before proceeding to the empirical analysis.
i) The span of control is greater than one and may be higher in upper
hierarchical positions than in lower ones (as in theCalvo andWellisz
[1979] model).
ii) Compensation increases with the hierarchical level, and the rate of
increase may be higher in top hierarchical positions if tournament
effects are present.
iii) In any hierarchical position, managers’ span of control will be
higher than the ratio between managers’ compensation and that
of their direct subordinates. This result is implied by an elasticity
of substitution between managers and their direct subordinates,
higher than one.
iv) Differences in human capital endowment should explain most of
the variance of compensation throughout hierarchical levels, if
firms use managerial talent to increase productivity. Under the
pure incentive effects of hierarchy, the variance of compensation
throughout hierarchical levels should be independent of human
capital endowments.
The same arguments apply to the influence of human capital
endowments on the level of responsibility (number of subordi-
nates) assigned to each manager.
v) The elasticity of managerial compensation to the size of resources
commanded by the manager is lower than one in all managerial
positions. However, the importance of intralevel versus interlevel
variability in determining this elasticity is an empirical question.
The answer will tell us about the sources of difference in the size
of firms, difference in the number of hierarchical levels, and dif-
ference in span of control within levels.
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III. The Empirical Evidence
Most of the empirical predictions in the previous section can be tested
using data from a single firm. In fact, Baker et al. (1993) present descriptive
statistics about compensation and span of control of a single firm over time
that are consistent with our predictions i–iii. However, our database con-
cerns managers from different firms, and at the same time, the number of
managers from the same firm is very low; firm-by-firm analysis is therefore
not viable. Account will be taken of interfirm heterogeneity and the esti-
mated values of the span of control and salary ratios will be averages across
firms after controlling for firm-specific effects. However, we have infor-
mation about human capital variables for each manager, and therefore it is
possible to investigate how important these variables are in explaining the
pattern of managerial talent allocation and compensation (prediction iv).
Finally, we can relate our results with previous empirical evidence on the
elasticity of compensation to the size of resources controlled by a manager
and decompose it into interlevel and intralevel effects (prediction v).
The origin of our database is similar to that used by Leonard (1990)
and Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), in the sense that has been provided
by a consulting firm on human resources, Ingenieros Consultores Socie-
dad Ano´nima. We have information about 9,694 managers distributed
throughout 669 Spanish firms and six hierarchical levels, starting from
the position of the general manager. Although average firm size in the
sample is much smaller than the average size in American samples (569
employees and $138.5 million in sales compared with 30,000 employees
and $5 billion in sales), the sample is still biased toward relatively large
firms.5 The data are pooled for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992, which
implies that some firms may be repeated. However, reasons of confiden-
tiality do not allow us to know the identity of each firm.6
We have some information of a personal character (education, age, job
tenure) for each manager, as well as a description of his or her job (com-
pensation, hierarchical level, and the functional area inside the
firm—production, marketing, finance, and personnel). Table 1 presents
the descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the analysis. Notice
that compensation includes only base salary plus bonuses, although other
forms of compensation such as shares in the firm, stock options, and so
on, were very rare in Spain in the early 1990s and were basically non-
existent for middle-level managers.
One important variable in our analysis is the level of the manager in
the organizational hierarchy. The questionnaire sent to the firms asks for
5 Only 7.6% of the population of Spanish firms have more than 50 employees.
In our sample, 81% of the firms have more than 50 employees.
6 The conclusions do not change if we estimate the model for each separate
year.
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Descriptive Statistics
Cases
Compensation
w
Subordinates
A
University Degree
Age
h
Job Tenure
an Firms Sales
Graduate
S1
(%)
Undergraduate
S2
(%)
General managers ( )j p 0 669 13,096 486 71.75 20.63 48.18 8.88 669 14,121
Division managers ( )j p 1 185 9,599 164 70.81 18.92 45.48 6.76 76 16,018
Production:
Level 1 ( )j p 2 933 6,861 67 48.12 36.01 44.52 7.68 464 12,733
Level 2 ( )j p 3 1,576 4,948 46 29.19 41.50 43.07 7.81 452 16,720
Level 3 ( )j p 4 652 4,287 48 25.46 32.21 43.30 8.12 217 16,660
Level 4 ( )j p 5 168 4,026 79 16.67 46.63 43.67 7.14 54 34,160
Marketing:
Level 1 ( )j p 2 841 7,703 32 46.13 37.34 43.45 6.53 505 15,730
Level 2 ( )j p 3 1,226 5,810 17 30.75 45.76 41.71 6.00 399 19,326
Level 3 ( )j p 4 396 5,145 35 31.57 35.35 40.06 5.07 138 27,421
Level 4 ( )j p 5 100 5,117 73 16.00 46.63 43.67 4.64 26 32,577
Finance:
Level 1 ( )j p 2 813 7,200 23 58.92 28.17 42.03 6.95 560 13,877
Level 2 ( )j p 3 1,049 5,189 9 39.94 37.08 40.41 7.04 461 19,233
Level 3 ( )j p 4 312 4,969 9 32.05 35.90 40.93 6.71 138 36,070
Level 4 ( )j p 5 98 4,326 6 50.00 30.43 39.02 5.88 36 62,689
Personnel:
Level 1 ( )j p 2 255 6,954 15 53.73 36.47 43.98 7.35 250 26,636
Level 2 ( )j p 3 295 5,044 19 33.56 42.37 42.76 7.37 227 22,278
Level 3 ( )j p 4 103 4,819 11 40.78 35.92 40.03 6.51 64 58,921
Level 4 ( )j p 5 23 3,563 4 60.87 30.43 34.96 3.43 15 82,187
All sample 9,694 6,341 67 40.81 36.69 42.83 7.12 669 14,121
Note.—Average compensation is expressed in thousands of pesetas, sales in millions of pesetas (1990 value) for the managers (“Cases”) and firms
(“Firms”) represented in each category. Average age and job tenure are expressed in years. The category omitted in education is that of managers without
a university degree.
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the manager whose compensation data are requested, to be placed in one
of six hierarchical levels—starting from the general manager, followed by
division manager, functional area manager, and three consecutive hier-
archical levels below the functional area manager in each area. The hi-
erarchical levels do not explicitly refer to compensation levels, but there
is no way of knowing to what extent the levels respond to the actual steps
followed by the managers in being promoted within the firm, as in Baker
et al. (1993, 1994a). However, it is reasonable to assume that we should
be closer to the description of the hierarchy in Baker et al., for a single
firm, than to the hierarchy in Main et al. (1993) and Eriksson (1999),
where only managers in very top positions are considered, that is, vice
presidents who compete for the job of CEO. We should also bear in mind
that we have a large number of small firms in our sample, and therefore,
in some job positions only a few firms will register observations. As we
will show below, this is taken into account in the measurement of com-
pensation ratios and spans of control in each hierarchical position.
A more general issue is the use of single-firm or multifirm data to test
propositions about internal labor markets and firm’s organization.Having
complete data on job positions and compensation for a single firm over
time, as in Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b), avoids interfirm heterogeneity and
captures time dynamics. Static data from managers belonging to many
firms and jobs allow us to make interfirm comparisons and to introduce
small firms into the analysis. The theoretical propositions are all static
and concern common points of the hierarchical design of any organiza-
tion; in this case, therefore, it is important to test the propositions for a
range of different organizations. Previous empirical evidence shows that
organizational hierarchies tend to be stable over time (Baker et al. 1994a),
and therefore the static nature of our analysis should not be an obstacle
to generalizing the results.
Nevertheless, firms in our database have different hierarchical struc-
tures, and for some job positions, we only have information for a limited
sample of managers. This means that heterogeneity across firms deserves
special attention and our article develops a specific methodology to deal
with this. The recognition of heterogeneity is also important in correctly
interpreting certain empirical evidence obtained from aggregated firm-
level data, such as the elasticity of general mangers’ compensation to the
size of the firm.
Compensation, Span of Control, and Elasticities of Substitution
We first concentrate on the evolution of salaries and span of control
throughout the hierarchy (empirical predictions i–iii). In accordance with
the theoretical model, general managers are assigned to level 0, and the
salary of the lowest hierarchical level is exogenous. Define as the totalw5, i
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compensation of managers in level 5 at firm i, the lower level for which
information is available. The wage of manager k at the hierarchical level
j of the firm i, can be expressed, in logs, as
4
klnw p ln w b e ,k 5, i r( )rpj
where is the ratio between managers’ and direct subordinates’ com-br
pensation, , and captures the compensation variationb p w /w r r r1 k
within hierarchical levels inside the same firm or differences in salary
increases across the different firms in the sample.
The equation above can be written as
4
klnw p ln w b ek 5, i r( )rpj
4
p lnw  lnb   (3)5, i r k
rpj
4
p tE  a N   , i i, k j j, k k
i jp0
where is a dummy variable capturing firm-specific effects and is equalEi
to one for managers of firm i, and is otherwise zero. The coefficient
provides an estimation of manager compensation in the lowestt p lnwi 5, i
level of the hierarchy in firm i. The dummy variable takes the valueNj
of one for managers at level j, and is otherwise zero. The coefficient
measures the average increase in compensation from the4a p  lnbrpjj r
lowest level of the hierarchy to level j.
The model takes into account the data limitation due to missing in-
formation on managers in certain positions and due to differences in firm
size. Consider the case of missing information in level 4 of firm i. In this
case, firm i will be included to estimate compensation increases between
levels 5 and 3, but not in computing compensation increases between
hierarchical levels 5 and 4 or 4 and 3. However, if a firm is small and
only has managers at level 4, this firm will not be considered when com-
puting salary increases between hierarchical levels 4 and 5. Therefore
is estimated by taking into account the fact that compensation atlnw5, i
level 4 for this firm i will be . It is not therefore necessarylnw  lnb5, i 4
to have full information on all the hierarchical levels for each firm in order
to estimate the model. In this way, we can work with firms of different
sizes and with missing values, as is the case for the great majority of our
firms, according to columns of “firms” and “cases” in table 1.
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Once has been estimated, the rate of increase in compensation be-a j
tween levels j and , , is computed asj 1 lnb p lnw /wj j j1
ˆ
ˆ ˆln b p a  a , a p 0, j p 0, 1,… , 4.j j j1 5
Similarly, we can estimate the equations
5 5
nklnA p ln A  t e p lnA  ln t  n( )k 5, i r 5, i r k
rpj1 rpj1
4
p l E  m N  n ; (4) i i i, k j j, k k
jp0
5
n k kln (A /w ) p ln j  j e e( )k k n , 5 r1, ri
rpj1
4
p (l  t )E  (m  a )N  n   , (5) i i i i, k j j j, k k k
jp0
and obtain the logs for span of control
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln t p m  m , m p 0, j p 0, 1,… , 4,j j 1j 5
and elasticity of substitution
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆln j p (m  a ) (m  a ), j p 0, 1,… , 4.j, j1 j j j1 j1
The percentage of the variance in compensation explained by the
dummy variables of firms and level is reasonably high, at around 80%.
The estimation of average span of control (in logs) and average elasticity
of substitution (also in logs), across firms and levels, also shows reasonably
high , except in the area of production.2R
The empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions. Com-
pensation increases as we move to the top of the hierarchy and the span
of control and elasticity of substitution between managers and their direct
subordinates are both greater than one.
Notice also that, with the exception of division managers with respect
to functional area managers, the rate of increase in salaries is higher in
the top positions of the hierarchy, as the tournament theory predicts.7
However, the magnitude of these increases is much lower than in other
tournament studies. For example, Main et al. (1993) estimate an increase
of 150% in compensation for the CEO with respect to the first vice
president, and we obtain increases of less than 50% for the general man-
7 Equation (3) was estimated with the null hypothesis of constant and equallnbj
for all j. This hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level of statistical significance.
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Fig. 1.—Average estimated compensation by hierarchical level. General managers’ com-
pensation is set at 100. Average compensation across functional areas is obtained by weight-
ing estimated values by number of observations in each functional area.
ager with respect to the division manager.8 Figure 1 shows the evolution
of estimated average compensations throughout hierarchical levels, con-
sistent with the “convexity” predicted by the tournament theory.
According to table 2, tends to be higher for the top hierarchicalln tj
positions,9 which would be consistent with the supervision and talent
allocation model of Calvo and Wellisz (1978). Finally, a value of
significantly different from zero confirms that average compen-ln jj, j1
sation ratios are lower than the average span of control as the modelb tj j
predicts.
The estimated value for elasticity of substitution is higher at thejj, j1
position of the general manager.10 According to the model, this means
that, at the top of the hierarchy, the same increase of managerial talent
requires greater compensation increments than at lower levels (the cost
function of producing talent is more convex).
The Explanatory Power of Human Capital Variables
If human capital variables were unimportant in explaining the allocation
of managers to hierarchical positions, with the resulting implications for
8 Differences in average sizes for firms across samples and in their institutional
environments (ownership and governance) may explain these differences.
9 Equation (4) was estimated with the null hypothesis of constant and equalln tj
for all j. The hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level of statistical significance.
10 Equation (5) was estimated with the null hypothesis of constant andlnjj, j1
equal for all j. The hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level of statistical significance.
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Table 2
Salaries, Number of Subordinates, and Elasticities of Substitution
Production Marketing Finance Personnel
Manager ˆlnbj ˆln tj ˆlnjj,j1 ˆlnbj ˆln tj ˆlnjj, j1 ˆlnbj ˆln tj ˆlnjj, j1 ˆlnbj ˆln tj ˆlnjj, j1
General .4602** 1.3979** .9377** .2838** 1.2520** .8558** .4727** 1.4965** 1.0239** .4122** 1.5642** 1.1519**
Division .1468** .1917 .0449 .1192** .9648** .8456** .1268** .9778** .8510** .2873** 1.5554** 1.2681**
Level 1 .4402** .9961** .5559** .3981** 1.0856** .6874** .4629** 1.0671** .6042** .4212** .6269** .2056
Level 2 .2509** .3276** .0766 .2188** .5302** .3113** .1950** .4638** .2687** .1995** 1.0251** .8255**
Level 3 .2481** .5276** .2795* .2027** .0149 .1878 .1992** .6730** .4739** .2570** .7808** .5238
f 26.3183 6.8658 4.5159 17.2408 10.8293 7.5324 18.5732 11.4524 7.1026 14.0873 8.6738 5.7551
2R .8155 .5356 .4313 .7880 .7001 .6189 .8303 .7510 .6517 .8620 .7937 .7185
Number of
firms 578 577 640 357
Observations 4,048 3,277 3,090 1,176
Note.—The statistics f and correspond to eqq. (3)–(5). To obtain the level of significance for each one of the parameters presented, we estimate eqq. (3)–(5)2R
after changing the hierarchical level omitted; a total of 60 estimations, five estimations for each equation and functional area.
 Significantly different from zero at 10%.
* Significantly different from zero at 5%.
** Significantly different from zero at 1%.
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compensation and responsibility (resources under their control), then we
would find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that hierarchies respond
to the objective of providing incentives for homogeneous workers.
Methodologically, we want to test what part of the explanatory power
of hierarchical levels is due to differences in human capital endowment
throughout hierarchical levels, when it comes to explaining differences in
compensation and the number of total subordinates of a given manager
(our measure of resources controlled). To do so, we add our information
on the human capital of each manager (formal education categorized in
university graduates, , university undergraduates, , and others; age,S S1 2
; and job tenure, an) to the equations of compensation and number ofh
subordinates postulated above. Next, we decompose the total variance
explained by these equations into that part explained by hierarchical levels
, firm-specific effects , human capital variables,(N { N ) (E { E ) H {j i
, and all possible combinations among the three. Table 3{S , S , h, an}1 2
shows the results of the exercise.
The first three rows indicate the contribution to the of the regression,2R
when each variable is added to the model and the other two are already
included. As is the case in other studies (see Leonard 1990), human capital
variables add little explanatory power when we control for levels and
firms (between 2% and 3.5% in the case of compensation and almost
zero in the case of number of subordinates). Nevertheless, this accounts
only for variability within hierarchical levels. To evaluate the full con-
tribution of human capital variables, we also have to take into account
the explanatory power between hierarchical levels, which is part of the
interaction effects.
Row 5 provides this information. In the case of compensation, the
interaction between levels and human capital explains around 50% of the
variance explained by hierarchical levels (0.2736/[0.3131 0.2736
in the area of production). This means that half0.0045 0.0196] p 0.49
of the total explanatory power attributed to levels (half of the 57% in
the functional area of production) is due to differences in human capital
endowment throughout hierarchical levels. The proportion is quite similar
across functional areas and when we consider the number of subordinates.
The explanatory power of human capital variables, variance in com-
pensation and number of subordinates is more than 10 times higher when
it comes from differences in human capital endowments throughout hi-
erarchical levels, than when it comes from differences in human capital
within a hierarchical level. The hypothesis of human capital as determinant
of managerial allocation in hierarchies is difficult to reject. Although the
fact that the remaining half of the variance explained by hierarchical levels
is due to other (unknown) factors leaves room for incentive effects, such
as those predicted by the efficiency wage and tournament literature.How-
ever, it should be noted that the information on human capital is limited
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Table 3
Explanatory Power of Levels, Firms, and Human Capital Variables
Production Marketing Finance Personnel
Compensation:
1. Levels .3131 .2937 .3158 .3091
2. Firms .1802 .2321 .2156 .1689
3. Human capital .0294 .0174 .0223 .0207
4. Levels and firms .0045 .0013 .0198 .0517
5. Levels and human
capital .2736 .2288 .3130 .3466
6. Firms and human
capital .0727 .0375 .0566 .0456
7. Firms and human
capital and levels .0196 .0054 .0509 .0598
8. Total .8449 .8054 .8526 .8828
No. of subordinates:
1. Levels .1718 .2928 .3576 .3726
2. Firms .3005 .2879 .2235 .2426
3. Human capital .0041 .0040 .0025 .0021
4. Levels and firms .0500 .0134 .0199 .0040
5. Levels and human
capital .0940 .1414 .2064 .2164
6. Firms and human
capital .0322 .0117 .0188 .0125
7. Firms and human
capital and levels .0129 .0202 .0354 .0544
8. Total .5397 .7041 .7535 .7958
Note.—The values presented in each row are computed as follows: ;2 2Row 1{R RH,N,E H,E
; ; ;2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Row 2{R R Row 3{R R Row 4pR R R Row 7 Row 5pR H,N,E H,N H,N,E N,E N E N,E H
; ;2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2R R Row 7 Row 6pR R R Row 7 Row 7pR  (R R R )N H,N H E H,E H,N,E H,E H,N N,E
; . For example, in the case of compensation, , is the percentage of2 2 2 2 2(R R R ) Row 8{R RH E N H,N,E H,N,E
the compensation variance explained by the equation 2lnw p c d S d S  eh  fh  gan k 0 1 1,k 2 2,k k k k
. The expression is the percentage of the compensation variance explained by24 lE  mN u Ri jp0i i,k j j,k k H
the equation . The expression is the percentage of2 2lnw p c d S d S  eh  fh  gan u Rk 0 1 1,k 2 2,k k k k k N
the compensation variance explained by the equation . Finally, is the24lnw p c  mN u Rjp0k 0 j j,k k H,N
percentage of the compensation variance explained by the equation lnw p c d S d S  eh k 0 1 1,k 2 2,k k
.2 4fh  gan  mN ujp0k k j j,k k
(we do not have details on investment in training different from university
degrees) and a part of these unknown factors could also be related to
differences in human capital endowments.
The Elasticity of Compensation to Size
Many papers have documented the fact that CEOs’ compensation in-
creases with the size of the firm they manage.11 Moreover, the elasticity
of compensation (salary and bonus) to size (sales, assets, and employees)
clusters around the estimated value of 25% and is always lower than one
(see Rosen 1992). The human capital perspective of wage formation and
managerial talent allocation presented immediately above explains this
11 Murphy (1985) shows that this result is quite robust to the inclusion of
performance variables and firm-specific effects to the regression model.
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evidence. There are, however, a few additional issues worth considering.
Is elasticity of compensation to size lower than one for managers in each
level of the hierarchy? What are the main determinants of this elasticity,
interlevel or intralevel variability of compensation and span of control?
To answer these questions, we consider a hypothetical sample of man-
agers in which manager k receives compensation and has a total numberwk
of direct and indirect subordinates equal to . The elasticity of com-Ak
pensation to number of subordinates would be estimated by ordinary
least squares regression of the log-linear model,
lnw p c  c lnA  e , (6)k 0 1 k k
where and are the parameters to be estimated and is the errorc c e0 1 k
term. If managers belong to firms that have observations in all hierarchical
positions; if firms have constant and equal span of control in all points
of the hierarchy; if the relation between salaries in two consecutive hi-
erarchical positions is constant; and if there is no intralevel variation of
salaries and number of subordinates; then, from equation (2), the elasticity
of compensation to number of subordinates, , will be equal tocˆ1
lnb
cˆ p .1 ln t
The theory predicts, and is supported by the empirical evidence, that
and, therefore, . The actual estimated value of is con-ˆ ˆln t 1 lnb c ! 1 c1 1
sistent with many combinations of b and t. Simon (1957) considers that
reasonable values for b and t are 1.5 and 3, respectively, which implies a
value of , higher than the empirical regularity of 0.25 observedcˆ p 0.371
in most studies with U.S. data.
The homogeneity conditions assumed above will, in general, not be
satisfied and managers will most probably come from heterogeneous hi-
erarchies in terms of number of levels, observations in each position,
compensation, and span of control. Appendix B shows how such het-
erogeneity determines the value of compensation elasticity to number of
subordinates, . This value depends on the interlevel average values ofcˆ1
salary increases and the span of control log throughout thelnb ln tj j
observed levels ; on the intralevel heterogeneity of manager andcˆINTER
subordinate compensation ; on the elasticity for unobserved hier-cˆINTRA
archical levels ; and the consequences of missing managers or levelscˆUNOBS
.cˆMISSING
An alternative but complementary way of taking into account the het-
erogeneity in the sample used to estimate is to obtain separate estimatescˆ1
of in each hierarchical level, , together with their interactioncˆ j p 0, … , 51, j
effect . The latter is in fact the elasticity obtained in the hypotheticalcˆAV
case that all executives earn average compensation and supervise an average
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Table 4
Determinants of the Elasticity of Compensation to Number of Subordinates
Production Marketing Finance Personnel
E W E W E W E W
General managers
cˆ1,0 .032 .111 .023 .138 .026 .159 .015 .189
Division managers
cˆ1,1 .067 .027 .076 .028 .050 .045 .072 .082
Level 1 functional
area cˆ1,2 .105 .200 .108 .145 .148 .121 .165 .064
Level 2 functional
area cˆ1,3 .084 .297 .116 .189 .151 .121 .104 .098
Level 3 functional
area cˆ1,4 .092 .119 .066 .077 .087 .037 .143 .025
Level 4 functional
area cˆ1,5 .032 .044 .095 .023 .043 .009 .307 .004
Interlevel averages
cˆAV .460 .202 .288 .400 .295 .508 .281 .537
Parameter cˆ1 .156 .165 .196 .185
Interobserved levels
cˆINTER .437 .336 .293 .573 .305 .690 .278 .700
Intraobserved levels
cˆINTRA .044 .464 .055 .300 .046 .249 .046 .206
Unobserved levels
cˆUNOBS .146 .393 .131 .350 .167 .279 .108 .287
Missing values
cˆMISSING .354 .193 .293 .223 .331 .218 .261 .190
Note—E p elasticity; W p weight. For a complete explanation of the table, see app. B.
number of subordinates, computed for those managers placed at the same
hierarchical level and functional area. Appendix B also shows how to
aggregate the estimated parameters and in order to obtain theˆ ˆc c1, j AV
elasticity of compensation to number of subordinates, .cˆ1
Table 4 shows the results of estimating compensation elasticity to the
number of subordinates , and of applying the two decomposition pro-cˆ1
cedures just described, with our data on Spanish managers.12 The elasticity
of compensation to number of subordinates obtained for all the managers
in the sample is higher than the elasticity of compensation to size (salescˆ1
or employees) obtained with general managers only. In fact, is highercˆ1
than any , which implies that interlevel effects are relevant to es-ˆ ˆc c1, j AV
timating the elasticity of compensation to size. Notice also that the in-
terlevel elasticity obtainedwith the observed levels , and the elasticitycˆINTER
obtained for the average values at each hierarchical level of compensation
and number of subordinates are very similar. Moreover, their valuescˆAV
12 We have estimated general managers’ compensation elasticity with respect to
the volume of sales of the firm, equal to 0.075, much lower than the 0.25 obtained
from U.S. samples, although higher than the 0.03 value for the number of sub-
ordinates shown in table 4.
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are very close to the elasticity obtained by averaging the ratios in each
of the functional areas. Results appear displayed in table 2.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that the intralevel elasticity
of compensation to size, although significant, is very low compared with
the interlevel elasticity of compensation. Leonard (1990) and Gerhart and
Milkovich (1990) obtain even lower intralevel elasticity, with values at
around 0.005, 10 times lower than ours. This result suggests that differ-
ences in firm size are basically due to differences in the extension of
hierarchical levels, and much less to differences in the span of control at
the various hierarchical levels. This fact explains that the elasticity of
compensation to size, computed with data on compensation and span of
control in homogeneous hierarchies, is much higher than the elasticity
obtained by pooling heterogeneous managerial data, as is the case with
equation (6). Actually, with our data, the implicit elasticity in the estimated
values of and obtained for each hierarchical position is aroundlnb ln tj j
0.30 in the hierarchy ranging through the functional areas outside pro-
duction (marketing, finance, personnel) and is 0.45 in the hierarchy rang-
ing from general management through production. These results imply
differences in substitution elasticity across functional areas, a fact also
reflected in table 2. According to the model, the same increase of man-
agerial talent in the functional area of production requires lower com-
pensation increments than in the rest of functional areas (the cost function
of producing talent is less convex in the functional area of production).
IV. Conclusion
Although hierarchical organizations are characterized by the distri-
bution of salaries and spans of control in job positions, most of the
previous research has focused only on the distribution of salaries. The
span of control, and especially its relation with compensation, has been
neglected. Our article provides estimations of interlevel compensation
ratios and span of control from a sample of Spanish managers with job
positions from general managers down to level 4 in a given functional
area. The interpretation and implications of the estimated values are de-
rived from extensions of models that view the hierarchy as a coordination
device, allowing the hiring of more talented, and thereforemore expensive,
managers to reduce control losses or increase information-processing
capabilities.
In our empirical framework, compensation and span of control in each
point of the hierarchy will be jointly determined as the profit-maximizing
solution to the managerial allocation problem, where the exogenous var-
iable is the cost of contracting a manager of a given talent. Firms prefer
to allocate managers who are more talented to higher hierarchical posi-
tions, but talent increases at a decreasing rate. This also implies that, in
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the optimal solution, the span of control in each position and the elasticity
of substitution between managers of two consecutive hierarchical levels
are both greater than one. The empirical implication of these results is
that the positive association observed between managers’ compensation
and number of subordinates under their control (size of the firm) obeys
the fact that the ablest managers earn higher salaries and occupy higher
hierarchical positions.
The empirical evidence from a sample of Spanish firms and managers
is consistent with these predictions. Average increases in compensation
between consecutive hierarchical levels are all positive and significantly
different from zero, and the average estimates of span of control and
implicit substitution elasticity between subordinates and their direct man-
agers are greater than one. The article also finds that the explanatory
power of human capital variables in empirical models of the determinants
of compensation and resources controlled by managers (around 30% of
dependent variable variance) can be attributed almost entirely (90%) to
differences in human capital endowment throughout hierarchical levels.
The rest would be due to differences in human capital endowments within
levels. This also means that half of the explanatory power of hierarchical
levels, when the dependent variables are compensation and the number
of subordinates, can be attributed to the fact that the average endowment
of human capital increases as one gets closer to the top of the hierarchy.
Therefore, theories that consider human capital variables as determi-
nants of managers’ differences in compensation and level of responsibility
within organizations cannot be rejected with our data. Of course, there
is still room for other theories that explain differences in compensation
throughout hierarchical levels in terms of the need to provide incentives
for managers’ efforts.
The paper also looks at the empirical evidence for the relationship
between CEO compensation and the size of the firms. Rosen (1982)
modeled this relation in a two-level hierarchy where the elasticity of
substitution between managerial talent and direct workers was exogenous.
In our framework, this elasticity is endogenously determined by the de-
cision of the firm as regards the amount of human capital (talent) allocated
in each hierarchical position. Under convex cost functions of producing
human capital, in the optimal solution the elasticity of substitution will
be greater than one. For this reason, the ratio between the manager com-
pensation and that of their direct subordinates will be lower than the
managers’ span of control. Consequently, in a pooled sample of managers,
the elasticity of compensation to the size of the resources they manage
will be lower than one. The article decomposes the estimated elasticity
from pooled samples in different ways, which show that the interlevel
effects are more important than those of the intralevel in determining the
observed elasticity of compensation to size. This means that differences
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in the size of firms are due to differences in hierarchical levels, rather than
to differences in span of control within levels.
One important limitation of our data is that the number of observations
from the same firm is fairly small and that we cannot observe the evolution
of the managers over time. For this reason, we cannot replicate studies
such as those of Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b) at the firm level, nor can we
provide estimates of wage increases and span of control within each firm
in the sample. However, we are able to obtain average estimates of the
relevant variables across firms and job positions, and our empiricalmodels
explain a considerable part of the variance in compensation and subor-
dinates within the sample. Moreover, we can provide evidence on the
importance of properly accounting for intrafirm heterogeneity when per-
forming measurements using firm-level data.
Appendix A
Characterization of the Solution to the Allocation Problem
The profit-maximization problem is written as
n1 n1n n
z 1 z z z f(z )j n j j1 jmaxP p pb t  w L p pbL L  e L , L L z , z j j j n j j1,… n, 1… n
jp0 jp1jp1 jp1
subject to 1 ≥ z ≥ 0, t ≥ 1.j j
The theoretical results in the main text of the article are obtained from
the interior solution to the problem. Before deriving these, we show the
conditions that allow us to exclude corner solutions.
i) For any intermediate level k, cannot be an optimal solutiont p 1k1
since we can save excluding level k and still produce the same levelw Lk k
of output. For example, if the hierarchy has only one level, if t p0
, then profits would be , lower than pb, the outputL p 1 P p pbw1 1
of the top managers when producing alone.
ii) is not optimal for any k; is not optimal for any kz p 0 z p 1k k
such that . The derivative of P with respect to is2 ≤ k ≤ n Lj
P pQ
p (z  z ) w .j j1 j
L Lj j
If , this derivative is always negative. When , we havez ≤ z z p 1j j1 k
, and when . Therefore, ifz  z ≤ 0 z p 0, we have z  z ≤ 0k1 k k k1 k
, we choose , and when , we choose asz p 1 t p 1 z p 0 t p 1k k2 k k1
optimal spans of control. But from condition i we know that a firm
without levels or k dominates these solutions.k 1
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iii) Placing a manager with the highest talent in level 1, , thez p 11
profit function can be written as
n1 n Ljz f(1)j1P p pb t  w  e L .j j 1( )[ ]jp1 Ljp2 1
For example, in the one-level case, profits will be . Iff(1)P p [pb e ]L1
the term in brackets were positive, firms could earn infinite profits by
choosing . This would be equivalent to replicating infinite timesL p 1
firms with hierarchical levels by managers of talent equal to one,n 1
. We exclude this solution by assuming that competition in productz p 11
and/or labor markets will adjust prices such that, in equilibrium,p
; that is, managers of talent will earn a competitive profitf(1)P* p e z p 1
(or salary equal to their opportunity cost).
Characterization of the Interior Solution
First-order conditions:
P pQ
p (z  z ) w p 0 for j p 1, 2, … , n 1. (A1)j j1 j
L Lj j
P pQ
p z w p 0 for j p n.n n
L Lj j
P ′p ln (t )pQ f (z )w L p 0 for j p 0,… , n 1. (A2)j j1 j1 j1
zj1
Second-order conditions: The Hessian matrix must be negative semi-def-
inite. Among the conditions to be satisfied, we have
2 P pQ
p (z  z )(z  z  1) ! 0;j j1 j j1 2L L Lj j j
2 P
2 ′′ ′ 2p [ln (t )] pQ { f (z ) [ f (z )] }w L ! 0. (A3)j j1 j1 j1 j1
z zj j
If there is an interior solution to the maximization problem, this solution
will be characterized by the following conditions:
1. If the firms obtain profits, . From equation (A1)n w L /pQ ! 1jp1 j j
we obtain that . The talent of then n w L /pQ p  z  z p z ! 1jp1 jp1j j j j1 1
general managers will therefore be greater than the talent of their(z p 1)0
direct subordinates .(z ! 1 p z )1 0
From (A1) we also obtain that . Workers will(z  z ) p w L /pQ 1 0j j1 j j
be distributed throughout the hierarchical levels as a function of their
talent and, since is increasing in , those located at levels closer toz w zj j j
the top of the hierarchy will receive greater compensation.
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2. Combining (A1) and (A2), we obtain
′ln (t ) p f (z )(z  z ) 1 0, (A4)j j1 j1 j2
the number of managers assigned to any hierarchical level increases as we
move up the hierarchy (a span of control greater than one).
3. Proposition. The differences of between contiguous hierarchicalzj
levels will decrease as we go up the hierarchy .(z  z ) 1 (z  z )j1 j2 j j1
Proof. Comparing equation (A1) referring to hierarchical level j
with that referring to hierarchical level j, we obtain,1 w L /w L pj1 j1 j j
, and, in logarithmic terms:(z  z )/(z  z )j1 j2 j j1
L w z  zj1 j j1 j2ln (t ) p ln p ln  lnj L w z  zj j1 j j1
z  zj1 j2
p [ f(z ) f(z )] ln . (A5)j j1 z  zj j1
a) For any pair of values, and , between zero and one,z z 1 1 z 1j j2 j
, the value of , does not fulfill the necessaryz 1 0 z p (z  z )/2j2 j1 j j2
optimality conditions. Replacing (A5) in (A4) we obtain
z  zj1 j2 ′ln p f (z )(z  z ) [ f(z ) f(z )].j1 j1 j2 j j1z  zj j1
Since for , the abovez p (z  z )/2 ln (z  z )/(z  z ) p 0,j1 j j2 j1 j2 j j1
equation will only be zero when .′′f p 0
This shows that at the optimum solution, if is greater than zero, the′′f
differences in between hierarchical levels will never be equal.zj
b) At the point analyzed, , if is fulfilled, then′′z p (z  z )/2 f 1 0j1 j j2
the first-order condition will not be satisfied, because using the above
relationships,
P z  zj1 j2 ′p ln  [ f(z ) f(z )] f (z )(z  z ) 1 0.j j1 j1 j1 j2
z z  zj1 j j1
For the existence of a single interior maximum, the second-order equation,
2 P ′′ ′ 2p { f (z ) [1 (z  z )][ f (z )] }w L ! 0,j1 j1 j2 j1 j1 j1
z zj1 j1
must be satisfied for any value of between and , implying thatz z zj1 j j2
the optimum value will be greater than the average point,z* z* 1j1 j1
. In other words, at the optimum, and con-(z  z )/2 2z* 1 (z  z )j j2 j1 j j2
sequently . Q.E.D.(z*  z ) 1 (z  z* )j1 j2 j j1
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Table A1
Interior Solutions
Variables
Number of Hierarchical Levels
n p 1 n p 2 n p 3 n p 4 n p 5 n p 6
z1 .466 .660 .771 .837 .859 .850
z2 . . . .353 .543 .659 .721 .751
z3 . . . . . . .290 .465 .571 .638
z4 . . . . . . . . . .249 .405 .510
z5 . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 .365
z6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198
t0 96.596 28.925 14.164 8.499 6.122 5.060
t1 . . . 25.068 13.448 8.423 5.854 4.650
t2 . . . . . . 12.676 8.328 5.656 4.313
t3 . . . . . . . . . 8.305 5.493 4.001
t4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.351 3.672
t5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.313
Profits (P) .251 w0 .548 w0 .842 w0 1w0 .935 w0 .741 w0
Example
Consider the case where manager compensation with talent relativez ,j
to top manager compensation, is given byz p 1,0
w w(z )j j 2p p exp ( f(z ) f(z )) p exp (10 7z  3z ).j 0 j jw w(z )0 0
Additionally, if the top manager does not hire any workers, thez p 10
relative compensation obtained by thus working alone is pb/w p0
.2.8836e
The interior optimal solutions, and for different values of n, hi-z tj j
erarchical levels, have been computed (see table A1) solving numerically
the first-order conditions rewritten as
Dz z Dz Dzn1 n j j1
p and p for j p 1,… , n 2;′ ′f(z )f(z ) f (z )z f(z )f(z ) f (z )Dzn1 n n n j j1 j1 j1e e e e
′f (z )*(z z )j1 j1 j2t p e for j p 1,… , n 1;j
w Ln n′f (z )*(z )n nt p e and z p .n1 n pQ
The illustration confirms that in the interior solutions andDz 1 Dzj1 j
. Profits increase with n until , where they are maximized andt 1 1 n p 4j
reach a level where they just compensate the opportunity cost of the
general manager; that is, this would also be the competitive equilibrium
solution.
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Appendix B
The Elasticity of Compensation to Number of Subordinates
Estimation of the Elasticity of Compensation to Subordinates with
Data on Increases in Compensation and Span of Control
Given equations (3) and (4) we can state
4
lnw p lnA  (t  l )E  (a  m )N    n .k k i i i, k j j j, k k k
jp0
If we estimate equation (6)
lnw p c  c lnA  e , (B1)k 0 1 k k
the estimated value of will be equal toc1
Cov (w ,A ) Cov (a N  tE , m N  l E ) Cov ( , n )k k j j, k i i, k j j, k i i, k k kcˆ p p 1 Var (lnA ) Var (lnA ) Var (lnA )k k k
Var (m N ) Var (n ) Var (l E )j j, k k i i, k
ˆ ˆ ˆp c  c  cINTER INTRA UNOBSVar (lnA ) Var (lnA ) Var (lnA )k k k
2Cov (l E , m N )i i, k j j, k
ˆ c ,MISSING Var (lnA )k
where is the interlevel elasticitycˆ p Cov (a N , m N )/Var (m N )INTER j j, k j j, k j j, k
in the observed levels; the intralevel elasticity is defined as cˆ pINTRA
; the elasticity in the unobserved levels is ˆCov ( , n )/Var (n ) c pk k k UNOBS
, and the consequences of a missing managerCov (tE ,l E )/Var (l E )i i, k i i, k i i, k
or levels is measured by
Cov (tE , m N )Cov (l E , a N )i i, k j j, k i i, k j j, kcˆ p .MISSING 2Cov (l E , m N )i i, k j j, k
Given the following assumptions:
i) Errors are noncorrelated; .Cov ( , n )/Var (n ) p 0k k k
ii) We have information for all the hierarchical levels and for all the
executives that occupy these in each of the firms; (Cov (tE , m N )i i, k j j, k
. The parameter will beˆCov (l E , a N ))/2Cov (l E , m N ) p 0 ci i, k j j, k i i, k j j, k 1
equal to
Var (m N )Cov (a N , m N ) Var (l E )Cov (tE , l E )j j, k j j, k j j, k i i, k i i, k i i, kcˆ p  .1 Var (lnA ) Var (m N ) Var (lnA ) Var (l E )k j j, k k i i, k
We define , , , andn 14 4 ia p  lnb m p  ln t t p lnw  lnbrpj rpj rp5j r j r i n ri
, where is the number of hierarchical levels that make upn 1il p  ln t nrp5i r i
the firm and is the compensation of their direct workers. Consideringi wni
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the above equations and the relation , the value ofln t p lnb  ln jr r r, r1
the parameter will becˆ1
4 4
Cov  ln (t /j )N ,  x N( )r r, r1 j, k r j, k
rpj rpj
cˆ p1 Var (lnA )k
n 1 n 1i i
Cov lnw   ln (t /j ) E ,  (ln t )E( )( )n r r, r1 i, k r i, ki
rp5 rp5

Var (lnA )k
n 1i
Cov lnA   ln j ln (A )( )( )k r, r1 k
rpj
p
Var (lnA )k
n 1i
Cov  ln j , ln (A )( )r, r1 k
rpj
p 1 .
Var (lnA )k
iii) If we further assume that increases in salaries and number of subor-
dinates are constant throughout the hierarchy , andln t p ln t, lnb p lnbj j
, then the value of the estimated parameter will beln j p ln jj, j1
n 1i
Cov  ln j, ln (A )( )k
rpj
cˆ p 11 Var (lnA )k
Cov ((n  j) ln j, (n  j) ln t) ln j lnbi i
p p 1 p .
Var ((n  j) ln t) ln t ln ti
Decomposition by Hierarchical Levels
We can also decompose the elasticity of compensation to subordinates
by hierarchical levels.
5Cov (ln (w ), ln (A )) Var (ln (A )N )k k k j, k
ˆ ˆc p p c1 1, jVar (lnA ) Var (lnA )jp0k k
Var (lnA )N( )K J, k
ˆc .AV Var (lnA )k
Where is the elasticity of compensation to number of subordinatescˆ1, j
computed only with those executives allocated at hierarchical level ,j
.cˆ p Cov (lnw N , lnA N )/Var (lnA N )1, j k j, k k j, k k j, k
The parameter is the elasticity of compensation to number of sub-cˆAV
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ordinates in the case of all executives earning the average salary and di-
recting the average number of subordinates within the hierarchical level
that they occupy, and , respectively; ˆln (w )N ln (A )N c pk j, k k j, k AV
, )/Cov (ln (w )N ln (A )N Var (lnA N ).k j, k k j, k k j, k
References
Baker, George; Gibbs, Michael; and Holmstro¨m, Bengt. “Hierarchies and
Compensation: A Case Study.” European Economic Review 37 (April
1993): 366–78.
———. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel
Data.”Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November 1994): 881–919.
(a)
———. “The Wage Policy of a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
109 (November 1994): 921–55. (b)
Beckmann, Martin J. “Management Production Functions and the Theory
of the Firm.” Journal of Economic Theory 14 (February 1977): 1–18.
Blaug, Mark, ed. The Economic Value of Education. Aldershot: Edward
Elgar, 1992.
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Wellisz, Stanislaw. “Supervision, Loss of Con-
trol, and the Optimum Size of the Firm.” Journal of Political Economy
86 (October 1978): 943–52.
———. “Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution.” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 87 (October 1979): 991–1010.
Eriksson, Tor. “Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Em-
pirical Test on Danish Data.” Journal of Labor Economics 17 (April
1999): 262–80.
Geanakoplos, John, and Milgrom, Paul. “A Theory of Hierarchies Based
on Limited Managerial Attention.” Journal of the Japanese and Inter-
national Economies 5 (September 1991): 205–25.
Gerhart, Barry, and Milkovich, George T. “Organizational Differences in
Managerial Compensation and Financial Performance.” Academy of
Management Journal 33 (December 1990): 663–91.
Gibbons, Robert, and Waldman, Michael. “A Theory of Wage and Pro-
motion Dynamics inside Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114
(November 1999): 1321–58.
Holmstro¨m, Bengt, and Tirole, Jean. Handbook of Industrial Organi-
zation, vol. 1, edited by R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, chap. 2.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1989.
Lambert, Richard A.; Larcker, David F.; and Weigelt, Keith. “The Struc-
ture of Organizational Incentives.” Administrative Science Quarterly
38 (September 1993): 438–61.
Lazear, Edward. “The Job as a Concept.” In Performance Measurement,
Evaluation and Incentives, edited by William Burns. Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1992.
Lazear, Edward, and Rosen, Sherwin. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Op-
timum Labor Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (October
1981): 841–64.
This content downloaded from 158.109.228.209 on January 19, 2016 02:07:13 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
876 Ortı´n-A´ngel/Salas-Fuma´s
Leonard, Jonathan S. “Executive Pay and Firm Performance.” Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 43 (February 1990): 13–29.
Main, Brian G. M.; O’Reilly III, Charles A.; and Wade, James. “Top
Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?” Journal of Labor Econom-
ics 11 (October 1993): 606–28.
Mincer, Jacob. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974.
Murphy, Kevin J. “Corporate Performance andManagerialRemuneration:
An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (April
1985): 11–42.
———. “Executive Compensation.” In Handbook of Labor Economics,
vol. 3, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1999.
Qian, Yingvi. “Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy.”
Review of Economic Studies 61 (July 1994) 527–44.
Rosen, Sherwin. “Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings.”
Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn 1982): 311–23.
———. “Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments.” American
Economic Review 76 (September 1986): 701–15.
———. “Contracts and the Market for Executives.” In Contract Eco-
nomics, edited by Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander. Oxford: Blackwell,
1992.
Simon, Herbert A.Administrative Behavior. 2d ed. NewYork: Free Press,
1957.
Waldman, Michael. “Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Dis-
tribution.” Review of Economic Studies 51 (January 1984): 95–109.
Williamson, Oliver. “Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size.”
Journal of Political Economy 75 (April 1967): 123–38.
This content downloaded from 158.109.228.209 on January 19, 2016 02:07:13 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
